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"Mercy-Killing"
Legislation-A Rejoinder
Respondin to the objections to legalization of
voluntary euthanasia raised by Professor Yale
Kamisar in an Article in our preceding issue, Professor Williams concludes that the desire to prevent cruelty and the liberty of both doctor and
patient outweigh the possible harmful effects to
the social order which might be caused by freeing "mercy-killing" from criminal law sanctions.

Glanville Williams*
welcome Prpfessor Kamisar's reply 1 to my argument for
voluntary euthanasia, because it is on the whole a careful, scholarly
wvork, keeping to knowable facts and accepted human v~ilues. It is,
therefore, the sort of reply that can be rationally considered and
dealt with.2 In this short rejoinder I shall accept most of Professor
Kamisar's valuable footnotes, and merely submit that they do not
bear out his conclusion.
The argument in favour of voluntary euthanasia in the terminal
stages of painful diseases is quite a simple one, and is an application
of two values that are widely recognised. The first value- is the
prvention of cruelty. Much as men differ in their ethical assessments, all -agree that cruelty is an evil-the only difference of
opinion residing.-in what is meant by cruelty. iThose who plead for
the legalizatioxi of 6utasi thuik that it is ud to allow a human
being to linger for months'in the last stages of agony, weakness and
decay, and to refuse him his demand for merciful release. There is
also a second cruelty involved-not perhaps quite so compelling,
but still worth consideration: the agony of the relatives in seeing
their loved one in his desperate plight. Opponents of euthanasia are
apt to take a cynical view of the desires of relatives, and this may
sometimes be justified. But it cannot be denied that a wife who has

I

* Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge Umversity.
1. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercj-Klling" Legislation, 42 Mns. L. RE:v. 969 (1958).,deal with the issue from a utilitarian point of
2. Professor Kamisar professes
mew and generally does so. But he lapses when he says that "the need the euthanasiast
advances. . . is a good deal less compelling [than the need to save life]. It is only
to ease par." Kamisar, supranote 1, at 1008. This is, of course, on Benthamite principles,
an inadmissible remark.
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to nurse her husband through the last stages of some terrible disease
may herself be so deeply affected by the experience that her health
is ruined, either mentally or physically. Whether the situation can
be eased for such a person by voluntary euthanasia I do not know;
probably it depends very much on the individuals concerned, which
is as much as to say that no solution in terms of a general regulatory
law can be satisfactory. The conclusion should be in favour of individual discretion.
The second value involved is that of liberty. The criminal law
should no-tfb invoked to repress conduct unless this is demonstrably
necessary on social grounds. What social interest is there in preventing the sufferer from choosing to accelerate his death by a few
months? What positive value does his life still possess for society,
that he is to be retained in it by the terrors of the criminal law?
And, of course, the liberty involved is that of the doctor as well as
that of the patient. It is the doctor's responsibility to do all he can
to prolong worth-while life, or, in the last resort, to ease his patient's
passage. If the doctoi honestly and sincerely believes that the best
service he can perform for his suffering patient is to accede to his
request for euthanasia, it is a grave thing that the law should forbid
him to do so.
This is the short and simple case for voluntary euthanasia, and,
as Kamisar admits, it cannot be attacked directly on utilitarian
grounds. Such an attack can only be by finding possible evils of an
indirect nature. These evils, in the view of Professor Kamisar, are
(1) the difficulty of ascertaining consent, and arising out of that the
danger of abuse; (2) the risk of an incorrect diagnosis; (3) the risk
of administering euthanasia to a person who could later have been
cured by developments in medical knowledge; (4) the "wedge"
argument.
Before considering these matters, one preliminary comment may
be made. In some parts of his Article Kamisar hints at recognition
of the fact that a practice of mercy-killing exists among the most
reputable of medical practitioners. Some of the evidence for this
will be found in my book.3 In the first debate in the House of Lords,
Lord Dawson admitted the fact, and claimed that it did away with
the need for legislation. In other words, the attitude of conservatives
is this: let medical men do mercy-killing, but let it continue to be
called murder, and be treated as such if the legal machinery is by
some unlucky mischance made to work; let us, in other words, take
no steps to translate the new morality into the concepts of the law. I
find this attitude equally incomprehensible in a doctor, as Lord
Dawson was, and in a lawyer, as Professor Kamisar is. Still more
3. Tm
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baffling does it become when Professor Kamisar seems to claim as
a virtue of the system that the jury can give a merciful acquittal
in breach of their oaths.4 The result is that the law frightens some
doctors from interposing, while not frightening others- though
subjecting the braver group to the risk of prosecution and possible
loss of liberty and livelihood. Apparently, in Kamisar's view, it is a
good thing if the law is broken in a proper case, because that relieves
suffering, but also a good thing that the law is there as a threat in
order t6 prevent too much mercy being administered; thus, whichever result the law has is perfectly right and proper. It is hard to
understand on what moral principle this type of ethical ambivalence
is to be maintained. If Kamisar does approve of doctors administering euthanasia in some clear cases, and of juries acquitting them if
they are prosecuted for murder, how does he maintain that it is an
insuperable objection to euthanasia that diagnosis may be wrong
and medical knowledge subsequently extended?
However, the references to merciful acquittals disappear after
the first few pages of the Article, and thenceforward the argument
develops as a straight attack on euthanasia. So although at the beginning Kamisar says that he would hate to have to argue against
mercy-killingin a clear case, in fact he does proceed to argue against
it with some zest.
In my book I reported that there were some people who opposed
the Euthanasia Bill as it stood, because it brought a ridiculous
number of formalities into the sickroom, and pointed out, without
any kind of verbal elaboration, that these same people did not say
that they would have supported the measure without the safeguards.
I am puzzled by Professor Kamisar's description of these sentences
of mine as -more than bitter comments."5 Like his references to my
"ire," my "neat boxing" and "gingerly parrying," it seems to be justified by considerations of literary style. However, if the challenge is
made, a sharper edge can be given to the criticism of this opposition than I incorporated in my book.
The point at issue is this. Opponents of voluntary euthanasia say
that it must either be subject to ridiculous and intolerable formalities, or else be dangerously free from formalities. Kamisar accepts
this line of argument, and seems prepared himself to ride both horses
at once. He thinks that they present an ordinary logical dilemma,
saying that arguments made in antithesis may each be valid. Perhaps
I can best explain the fallacy in this opinion, as I see it, by a parable.
In the State of Ruritania many people live a life of poverty and
misery. They would be glad to emigrate to happier lands, but the
4. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 971-72.
5. Id. at 982.
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law of Ruritania bans all emigration. The reason for this law is that
the authorities are afraid that if it were relaxed there would be too
many people seeking to emigrate, and the population would be
decimated.
A member of the Ruritanian Senate, whom we will call Senator
White, wants to see some change in this law, but he is aware of the
power of traditional opinion, and so seeks to word his proposal in a
modest way. According to his proposal, every person, before being
allowed to emigrate, must fill up a questionnaire in which he states
his income, his prospects and so on; he must satisfy the authorities
that he is living at near-starvation level, and there is to be an Official
Referee to investigate that his answers are true.
Senator Black, a member of the Government Party, opposes the
proposal on the ground that it is intolerable that a free Ruritanian
citizen should be asked to write out these humiliating details of
his life, and particularly that he should be subject to the investigation of an Official Referee.
Now it will be evident that this objection of Senator Black may be
a reasonable and proper one if the Senator is prepared to go further
than the proposal and say that citizens who so wish should be entitled to emigrate without formality. But if he uses his objections to
formality in order to support the existing ban on emigration, one
can only say that he must be muddle-headed, or self-deceptive, or
hypocritical. It may be an interesting exercise to decide which of
these three adjectives fit him, but one of them must do so. For any
unbiased mind can perceive that it is better to be allowed to emigrate on condition of form-filling than not to be allowed to emigrate
at all.
I should be sorry to have to apply any of the three adjectives to
Professor Kamisar, who has conducted the debate on a level which
protects him from them. But, although it may be my shortcoming,
I cannot see any relevant difference between the assumed position
of Senator Black on emigration and the argument of Kamisar on
euthanasia. Substitute painful and fatal illness for poverty, and
euthanasia for emigration, and the parallel would appear to be
exact.
I agree with Kamisar and the critics in thinking that the procedure of the Euthanasia Bill was over-elaborate, and that it would
probably fail to operate in many cases for this reason. But this is no
argument for rejecting the measure, if)it is the mostthat public
opinion will accept.
Let me now turn to the proposal for voluntary euthanasia permitted without formality, as I have put it forward in my book.
Kamisar's first objection, under the heading of "The Choice," is
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that there can be no such thing as truly voluntary euthanasia in
painful and killing diseases. He seeks to impale the advocates of
euthanasia on an old dilemma. Either the victim is not yet suffering
pain, in which case his consent is merely an uninformed and anticipatory one- and -hecannot bind himself by contract to be killed
in the future-or he is crazed by pain and stupified by drugs, in
which case he is not of sound mind. I have dealt with this problem
in my book; Kamisar has quoted generously from it, and I leave the
reader to decide. As I understand Kamisars position, he does not
really persist in the objection. With the laconic 'Terhaps," he seems
to grant me, though unwillingly, that there are cases where one can
be sure of the patient's consent. But having thus abandoned his own
point, he then goes off to a different horror, that the patient may
give his consent only in order to relieve his relatives of the trouble of
looking after him.
On this new issue, I will return Kamisar the compliment and say:
"Perhaps." We are certainly in an area where no solution is going to
make things quite easy and happy for everybody, and all sorts of
embarrassments may be conjectured. But these embarrassments are
not avoided by keeping to the present law: we suffer from them
already. If a patient, suffering pain in a terminal illness, wishes for
euthanasia partly because of this pain and partly because he sees
his beloved ones breaking under the strain of caring for him, I do
not see how this decision on his part, agonizing though it may be, is
necessarily a matter of discredit either to the patient himself or to
his relatives. The fact is that, whether we are considering the patient
or his relatives, there are limits to human endurance.
The author's next objection rests on the possibility of mistaken
diagnosis. There are many reasons why this risk cannot be accurately
measured, one of them being that we cannot be certain how much
use would actually be made of proposed euthanasia legislation. At
one place in his Article the author seems to doubt whether the law
would do much good anyway, because we don't know it will be
used. ("Whether or not the general practitioner will accept the
responsibility Williams would confer on him is itself a problem of
major proportions." 6) But later, the Article seeks to extract the maximum of alarm out of the situation by assuming that the power will
be used by all and sundry-young practitioners just starting in
practice, and established practitioners who are minimally competent.7 In this connection, the author enters in some detail into
examples of mistaken diagnosis for cancer and other diseases. I
agree with him that, before deciding on euthanasia in any particular
6. Id. at 984.
7. Id. at 996.
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case, the risk of mistaken diagnosis would have to be considered.,
Everything that is said in the Article would, therefore, be most
relevant when the two doctors whom I propose in my suggested
measure come to consult on the question of euthanasia; and the
possibility of mistake might most forcefully be brought before the
patient himself. But have these medical questions any real relevance
to the legal discussion?
Kamisar, I take it, notwithstanding his wide reading in medical
literature, is by training a lawyer. He has consulted much medical
opinion in order to find arguments against changing the law. I ought
not to object to this, since I have consulted the same opinion for
the opposite purpose. But what we may well ask ourselves is this:
is it not a trifle bizarre that we should be doing it at all? Our profession is the law, not medicine; how does it come about that lawyers
have to examine medical literature to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of a medical practice?
If the import of this question is not immediately clear, let me
return to my imaginary State of Ruritania. Many years ago, in
Ruritania as elsewhere, surgical operations were attended with great
risk. Pasteur had not made his discoveries, and surgeons killed as
often as they cured. In this state of things, the legislature of Ruritania passed a law declaring all surgical operations to be unlawful
in principle, but providing that each specific type of operation might
be legalized by a statute specially passed for the purpose. The result
is that, in Ruritania, as expert medical opinion sees the possibility of
some new medical advance, a pressure group has to be formed in
order to obtain legislative approval for it. Since there is little public
interest in these technical questions, and since, moreover, surgical
operations are thought in general to be inimical to the established
religion, the pressure group has to work for many years before it gets
a hearing. When at last a proposal for legalization is seriously
mooted, the lawyers and politicians get to work upon it, considering
what possible dangers are inherent in the new operation. Lawyers
and politicians are careful people, and they are perhaps more prone
to see the dangers than the advantages in a new departure. Naturally they find allies among some of the more timid or traditional
or less knowledgeable members of the medical profession, as well as
among the priesthood and the faithful. Thus it is small wonder that
8. The author is misleading on my reference to capital punishment, which I did
not mention in connection with the occurrence of mistakes. See Kamisar, supra note 1,
at 1005. I merely pointed out the inconsistency of the theological position which admits
capital punishment and war as exceptions from the Sixth Commandment although not
expressed therein, and says that they are not "murder," while maintaining that a killing
done with a man's consent and for his benefit as an act of mercy is "murder." Whatever
moral distinction may be found between these rules, they cannot by any feat of ingenuity be deduced from the text of the Commandment.
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whereas appendicectomy has been practised in civilised countries
since the beginning of the present century, a proposal to legalize it
has still not passed the legislative assembly of Ruritania.
It must be confessed that on this particular matter the legal
prohibition has not been an unmixed evil for the Ruritanians. During
the great popularity of the appendix operation in much of the civilised world during the twenties and thirties of this century, large
numbers of these organs were removed without adequate cause, and
the citizens of Ruritania have been spared this inconvenience. On
the other hand, many citizens of that country have died of appendicitis, who would have been saved if they had lived elsewhere. And
whereas in other countries the medical profession has now learned
enough to be able to perform this operation with wisdom and restraint, in Ruritania it is still not being performed at all. Moreover,
the law has destroyed scientific inventiveness in that country in the
forbidden fields.
Nowin the United States and England we have no such absurd
general law on the subject of surgical operations as they have in
Ruritania."In principle, medical men are left free to exercise their
best-judgment, and the result has been a brilliant advance in knowledge and technique. But there are just two- or possibly threeoperations which are subject to the Ruritanian principle. These are
abortion, 9 euthanasia, and possibly sterilization of convenience. In
these fields we, too, must have pressure groups, with lawyers and
politicians warning us of the possibility of inexpert practitioners and
mistaken diagnosis, and canvassing medical opinion on the risk of
an operation not yielding the expected results in terms of human
happiness and the health of the body politic. In these fields we, too,
are forbidden to experiment to see if the foretold dangers actually
come to-pass. Instead of that, we are required to make a social judgment on the probabilities of good and evil before the medical profession is allowed to start on its empirical tests.
This anomaly is perhaps more obvious with abortion than it is
with euithanasia. Indeed, I am prepared for ridicule when I describe
euthanasia as a medical operation. Regarded as surgery it is unique,
since its object is not to save or prolong life but the reverse. But
euthanasia has another object which it shares with many surgical
operations-the saving of pain. And it is now widely recognised,
as Lord Dawson said in the debate in the House of Lords, that the
saving of pain is a legitimate aim of medical practice. The question
whether euthanasia will effect a net saving of pain and distress is,
perhaps, one that can be only finally answered by trying it. But it is
9. Lawful everywhere on certain health grounds, but not on soeio-medical grounds

(the overburdened mother), eugenic grounds, ethical grounds (rape, incest, etc.), or
social and libertarian grounds (the unwanted child).
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obscurantist to forbid the experiment on the ground that until it is
performed we cannot certainly know its results. Such an attitude, in
any other field of medical endeavor, would have inhibited progress.
The argument based on mistaken diagnosis leads into the argument based on the possibility of dramatic medical discoveries. Of
course, a new medical discovery which gives the opportunity of
remission or cure will almost at once put an end to mercy-killings in
the particular group of cases for which the discovery is made. On
the other hand, the discovery cannot affect patients who have already died from their disease. The argument based on mistaken
diagnosis is therefore concerned only with those patients who have
been mercifully killed just before the discovery becomes available
for use. The argument is that such persons may turn out to have
been "mercy-killed" unnecessarily, because if the physician had
waited a bit longer they would have been cured. Because of this risk
for this tiny fraction of the total number of patients, patients who
are dying in pain must be left to do so, year after year, against their
entreaty to have it ended.
Just how real is the risk? When a new medical discovery is
claimed, some time commonly elapses before it becomes tested sufflciently to justify large-scale production of the drug, or training in
the techniques involved. This is a warning period when euthanasia
in the particular class of case would probably be halted anyway.
Thus it is quite probable that when the new discovery becomes
available, the euthanasia process would not in fact show any mistakes in this regard.
Kamisar says that in my book I "did not deign this objection to
euthanasia more than a passing reference." I still do not think it is
worth any more than that.
The author advances the familiar but hardly convincing argument
that the quantitative need for euthanasia is not large. As one reason
for this argument, he suggests that not many patients would wish to
benefit from euthanasia, even if it were allowed. I am not impressed
by the argument. It may be true, but it is irrelevant. So long as there
are any persons dying in weakness and grief who are refused their
request for a speeding of their end, the argument for legalizing
euthanasia remains. Next, the Article suggests that there is no great
need for euthanasia because of the advances made with pain-killing
drugs. Kamisar has made so many quotations from my book that I
cannot complain that he has not made more, but there is one relevant point that he does not mention. In my book, recognising that
medical science does manage to save many dying patients from the
extreme of physical pain, I pointed out that it often fails to save
them from an artificial, twilight existence, with nausea, giddiness,
and extreme restlessness, as well as the long hours of consciousness
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of a hopeless condition. A dear friend of mine, who died of cancer of
the bowel, spent his last months in just this state, under the influence
of morphine, which deadened pain, but vomiting incessantly, day
in and day out The question that we have to face is whether the
unintelligent brutality of such an existence is to be imposed on one
who wishes to end it.
The Article then makes a suggestion which, for once, really is a
new one in this rather jaded debate. The suggestion appears to be
that if a man really wants to die he can do the job himself."'
Whether the author seriously intends this as advice to patients I
cannot discover, because he adds that he does not condone suicide,
but that he prefers a laissez-faire approach. Whatever meaning may
be attached to the author's remarks on this subject, I must say with
deep respect that I find them lacking in sympathy and imagination,
as well as inconsistent with the rest of his approach. A patient may
often be unable to kill himself when he has reached the last and
terrible stage of the disease. To be certain of committing suicide,
he must act in advance; and he must not take advice, because then
he might be prevented. So this suggestion multiplies the risks of
false diagnosis on which the author lays such stress. Besides, has he
not considered what a messy affair the ordinary suicide is, and what
a shock it is for the relatives to find the body? The advantage that
the author sees in suicide is that it is not "an approach aided and
sanctioned by the state." This is another example of his ambivalence, his failure to make up his mind on the moral issue. But it is
also a mistake, for under my legislative proposal the state would not
aid and sanction euthanasia. It would merely remove the threat of
punishment from euthanasia, which is an altogether different thing.
My proposal is, in fact, an example of that same laissez-faire approach which the author himself adopts when he contemplates
suicide as a solution.
The last part of the Article is devoted to the ancient "wedge" argument which I have already examined in my book. It is the trump
card of the traditionalist, because no proposal for reform, however
strong the arguments in favour, is immune from the wedge objection. In fact, the stronger the arguments in favour of a reform, the
more likely it is that the traditionalist will take the wedge objection
-it is then the only one he has. C. M. Cornford put the argument
in its proper place when he said that the wedge objection means
this, that you should not act justly today, for fear that you may be
asked to act still more justly tomorrow.
We heard a great deal of this type of argument in England in the
nineteenth century, when it was used to resist almost every social
10. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legilation, 42 Mi-N. L. Rmv. 969, 1011 (1958).
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and economic change. In the present century we have had less of
it, but (if I may claim the hospitality of these columns to say so) it
seems still to be accorded an exaggerated importance in American
thought. When lecturing on the law of torts in an American university a few years ago, I suggested that just as compulsory liability
insurance for automobiles had spread practically through the civilised world, so we should in time see the law of tort superseded in
this field by a system of state insurance for traffic accidents, administered independently of proof of fault. The suggestion was immediately met by one student with a horrified reference to "creeping
socialism." That is the standard objection made by many people to
any proposal for a new department of state activity. The implication is that you must resist every proposal, however admirable in
itself, because otherwise you will never be able to draw the line. On
the particular question of socialism, the fear is belied by the experience of a number of countries which have extended state control of
the economy without going the whole way to socialistic state regimentation.
Kamisar's particular bogey, the racial laws of Nazi Germany, is
an effective one in the democratic countries. Any reference to the
Nazis is a powerful weapon to prevent change in the traditional
taboo on sterilization as well as euthanasia. The case of sterilization
is particularly interesting on this; I dealt with it at length in my
book, though Kamisar does not mention its bearing on the argument.
When proposals are made for promoting voluntary sterilization on
eugenic and other grounds, they are immediately condemned by
most people as the thin end of a wedge leading to involuntary
sterilization; and then they point to the practices of the Nazis. Yet
a more persuasive argument pointing in the other direction can
easily be found. Several American states have sterilization laws,
which for the most part were originally drafted in very wide terms,
to cover desexualisation as well as sterilization, and authorizing
involuntary as well as voluntary operations. This legislation goes
back long before the Nazis; the earliest statute was in Indiana in
1907. What has been its practical effect? In several states it has
hardly been used. A few have used it, but in practice they have
progressively restricted it until now it is virtually confined to voluntary sterilization. This is so, at least, in North Carolina, as Mrs.
Woodside's study strikingly shows. In my book I summed up the
position as follows:
The American experience is of great interest because it shows how remote
from reality in a democratic community is the fear - frequently voiced by
Americans themselves-that voluntary sterilization may be the 'thin end
of the wedge,' leading to a large-scale violation of human rights as happened in Nazi Germany. In fact, the American experience is the precise
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opposite-starting with compulsory sterilization, administrative practice
has come to put the operation on a voluntary footing.

But it is insufficient to answer the "wedge" objection in general
terms; we must consider the particular fears to which it gives rise.
Kamisar professes to fear certain other measures that the Euthanasia
societies may bring up if their present measure is conceded to
them. Surely, these other measures, if any, will be debated on their
merits? Does he seriously fear that anyone in the United States is
going to propose the extermination of people of a minority race or
religion? Let us put aside such ridiculous fancies and discuss prac.
tical politics.
The author is quite right in thinking that a body of opinion would
favour the legalization of the involuntary euthanasia of hopelessly
defective infants, and some day a proposal of this kind may be put
forward. The proposal would have distinct limits, just as the proposal for voluntary euthanasia of incurable sufferers has limits. I do
not think that any responsible body of opinion would now propose
the euthanasia of insane adults, for the perfectly clear reason that
any such practice would greatly increase the sense of insecurity felt
by the borderline insane and by the large number of insane persons
who have sufficient understanding on this particular matter.
Kamisar expresses distress at a concluding remark in my book in
which I advert to the possibility of old people becoming an overwhelming burden on mankind. I share his feeling that there are
profoundly disturbing possibilities here; and if I had been merely
a propagandist, intent upon securing agreement for a specific measure of law reform, I should have done wisely to have omitted all
reference to this subject Since, however, I am merely an academic
writer, trying to bring such intelligence as I have to bear on moral
and social issues, I deemed the topic too important and threatening
to leave without a word. I think I have made it clear, in the passages cited, that I am not for one moment proposing any euthanasia
of the aged in present society; such an idea would shock me as
much as it shocks Kamisar and would shock everybody else. Still,
the fact that we may one day have to face is that medical science
is more successful in preserving the body than in preserving the
mind. It is not impossible that, in the foreseeable future, medical
men will be able to preserve the mindless body until the age, say,
of 1000, while the mind itself will have lasted only a tenth of that
time. What will mankind do then? It is hardly possible to imagine
that we shall establish huge hospital-mausolea where the aged are
kept in a kind of living death. Even if it is desired to do this, the
cost of the undertaking may make it impossible.
This is not an immediately practical problem, and we need not
yet face it. The problem of maintaining persons afflicted with senile
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dementia is well within our economic resources as the matter stands
at present. Yerhaps some barrier will be found to medical advance
which will prevent the problem becoming more acute. Perhaps, as
time goes on, and as the alternatives become more clearly realised,
men will become more resigned to human control over the mode of
termination of life. Or the solution may be that after the individual
has reached a certain age, or a certain degree of decay, medical
science will hold its hand, and allow him to be carried off by natural
causes." But what if these natural causes are themselves painful?
Would it not be better kindness to substitute human agency?
In general, it is enough to say that we do not have to know the
solutions to these problems. The only doubtful moral question on
which we have to make an immediate decision in relation to involuntary euthanasia is whether we owe a moral duty to terminate the
life of an insane person who is suffering from a painful and incurable
disease. Such a person is left unprovided for under the legislative
proposal formulated in my book. The objection to any system of
involuntary euthanasia of the insane is that it may cause a sense of
insecurity. It is because I think that the risk of this fear is a serious
one that a proposal for the reform of the law must leave the insane
out.
11. An interesting pronouncement, on which there would probably be a wide measure
of agreement, was made recently by Pope Pius XII before an international audience of
physicians. The Pope said that reanimation techniques were moral, but made it clear
that when life was ebbing hopelessly, physicians might abandon further efforts to stave
off death, or relatives might ask them to desist "in order to permit the patient, already
virtually dead, to pass on in peace." On the time of death, the Pope said that "Considerations of a general nature permit the belief that human life continues as long as the
vital functions - as distinct froem the simple ife of organs,- manifest themselves spontaneously or even with the help of artificial proceedings." By implication, this asserts
that a person may be regarded as dead when all that is left is 'the simple life of organs."
The Pope cited the tenet of Roman Catholic doctrine that death occurs at the moment
of "complete and definitive separation of body and soul." In practice, he added, the
terms "body" and "separation" lack precision. He explained that establishing the exact
instant of death in controversial cases was the task not of the Church but of the physician.
N. Y. Times, November 25, 1957, p. 1, col. 3.

